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INTRODUCTION
A financially distressed individual or corporation employs the
bankruptcy process only as a last resort. The study of bankruptcy law,
however, need not, and should not, be an afterthought. The traditional
bodies of law that compose private ordering are the laws of property,
contract, and tort. Property law establishes private entitlements that
can be specifically enforced against the world. Contract law permits
individuals to exchange obligations and thus invest one another with
entitlements. Tort law creates its own set of entitlements and imposes
Professor of Law, New York University. This brief Article shares its title with a bank-
ruptcy law monograph that the author is preparing. The Article is adapted from that monograph.
This Article, in its current form, has benefited greatly from comments given at the Vanderbilt
University Law School Symposium, "Convergence on Delaware: Corporate Bankruptcy and Cor-
porate Governance," for which it was prepared. Special thanks to Bob Rasmussen, who helped
me present the paper, to Alan Schwartz, who served as commentator, and to Henry Hansmann,
who provided comments at the Symposium and afterward.
1661
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
liability for unwanted interference with those or other entitlements.
These bodies of law are often presented as complete, either unto them-
selves or in combination with the others.1 Few might recognize these
laws as part of bankruptcy law, even broadly defined. But the issues of
bankruptcy law are inextricably intertwined with the rest of private
law.
The world is not so orderly that entitlements, obligations, or
duties are meaningful simply because the law intends them to be so.
In reality, property rights often matter only because obligations con-
flict, while obligations are breached and duties disregarded because
the obligor or transgressor simply lacks the capacity to comply. Where
such conflict or incapacity exists, bankruptcy law fills the breach, not
fully to resurrect all the impaired claims-this would be impossible-
but to choose among them. There are two points here. First, the classic
bodies of private law can best be seen, in part, as bankruptcy law
(broadly defined). Second, if one imagines that private individuals
transact in the shadow of the law, that shadow is cast no less by bank-
ruptcy law than by the classic law of property, contract, and tort, or by
derivatives thereof such as corporate law. The content of bankruptcy
law, as much as the distinct features of other bodies of law, can be ex-
pected to influence the activity of individuals, not merely after the fall,
but from the outset.
This approach to bankruptcy law is nontraditional in the
United States (and, as far as I know, anywhere in the world). Al-
though, as I hope to illustrate, bankruptcy law, properly understood,
is an inevitable part of private law, the traditional focus of bankruptcy
law has been on special law drafted into a code. Such special bank-
ruptcy law has been in place continuously in the United States since
1898. This law, and the law for the next eighty years, was narrow and
purely reactive, as was the scholarly perception of bankruptcy law
over that period. Both the original Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the
New Deal reforms that followed were, at least in part, a reaction to a
public outcry for relief from debt's burden on individual debtors, in
each case offered as a substitute for inflationary monetary policy. 2 For
corporate debtors, a different public outrage was at work, but again
1. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution,
73 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985). For a recent discussion of important functional distinctions within and
among these bodies of law, however, between property rights and liability rules, e.g., see Ian
Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules,
100 MICH. L. REV. 1, 75-79 (2001) (supplementing the analysis in Guido Calabresi & Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089-93 (1972)).
2. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION 107 (2001).
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focused on the postfailure world. The primary contribution of the New
Deal's Chandler Act, for example, was a response to the condemnation
by government investigators, most notably William 0. Douglas. These
investigators decried the perceived abuses by large banks, such as J.P.
Morgan, who, it was believed, took advantage of smaller investors
whenever a corporation attempted to reorganize. 3 The Chandler Act
placed independent trustees, rather than creditors, in control of corpo-
rate reorganizations. The academic debate of the time, led by Douglas
and his contemporaries, mirrored this preoccupation with a debtor's
postinsolvency affairs, 4 with hardly a whiff of broader policy or of con-
sequences for debtors who were not then in financial distress. This
narrow approach to bankruptcy law became the standard entrenched
for generations.
Myopia about bankruptcy law diminished sonewhat with the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and the attention this reform brought
to the topic. The law itself remained focused on financial crisis, a re-
tooling of the old act's mechanics, but scholars began to broaden their
outlook. Most notable in this regard was the publication in the mid-
1980s of Thomas Jackson's book, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy
Law.5 Jackson suggested that the bankruptcy laws can best be under-
stood as a hypothetical creditors' bargain.6 Jackson argued that at the
time they lend, creditors as a group, in anticipation of insolvency,
would prefer a collective debt-recovery process to a race among indi-
vidual creditors. 7 Bankruptcy law calls off such a race, which, Jackson
contended, would waste resources both in the aggregate transaction
costs of individual collection and through piecemeal liquidation of vi-
able business concerns.8 Thus, as compared to prior scholarship on
bankruptcy law, Jackson took an ex ante approach. He imagined how
creditors' anticipation of a debtor's financial crisis would shape the
creditors' preferences for bankruptcy law. But Jackson's approach,
while an important advance, was still too narrow. Jackson looked for
bankruptcy issues only in, or as reflected by, the Bankruptcy Code, as
3. Id. at 109-13.
4. See, e.g., George G. Battle, The Enactment of the New Bankruptcy Law Will Check the
Tendency Toward Currency Inflation, 19 VA. L. REV. 340 (1933); William 0. Douglas, Protective
Committees in Railroad Reorganizations, 47 HARV. L. REV. 565 (1934); Robert T. Swaine, "De-
mocratization" of Corporate Reorganizations, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 256 (1938); see also SKEEL, su-
pra note 2, at 73-127 (collecting authority).






opposed to elsewhere in law, and he assumed the presence of debt as a
starting point for his analysis. 9
The ideal analysis of bankruptcy law is not so limited in scope
or time. One cannot see the full picture of bankruptcy law unless one
considers more fundamental decisions about the allocation of property
rights and the creation of obligations or duties with respect to prop-
erty or person, decisions that may precede the issuance of debt. Ele-
ments of property, contract, and tort law raise issues that would be
familiar to any bankruptcy lawyer or scholar, but may be overlooked
by one with her nose buried in the Bankruptcy Code. An opportunity
for cross-discussion and analysis is thus lost. Bankruptcy issues,
moreover, may be relegated to characterization as "specialized," which
often means less than centrally important. But to the contrary, bank-
ruptcy issues, properly understood, are general and thus central.
There is, moreover, an additional failing of an approach to
bankruptcy law that starts with the Bankruptcy Code and its treat-
ment of debt obligations. Such analysis overlooks the fact that debt is
nothing more than a particular sort of obligation. Debt is constructed
of at least two components-namely, fixed payment and the right of
the holder individually to collect. Debt is not a primitive. Its compo-
nents can be constructed differently or adopted in part only. This ob-
servation is critical, as so much of what appears a quintessential part
of bankruptcy law given debt disappears in the absence of debt. Per-
haps ironically, then, this second shortcoming of the traditional ap-
proach to bankruptcy works counter to the first. Once one looks be-
yond debt, much of what is now associated with bankruptcy law
appears less central, less significant. Further, once one disaggregates
debt, and allows once seemingly important issues to drop away, it be-
comes possible to gain a clearer focus on first principles of financial
distress.
A brief elaboration of these ideas follows. Part I newly defines
bankruptcy law in its essence as any law, from whatever source, that
governs or permits insupportable obligations. Where such obligations
are necessarily inconsistent, the law provides a resolution. This is
bankruptcy law. Another common conception of bankruptcy law, one
that I accept here, is as relief provided to an overburdened individual
9. In a paper prepared contemporaneously with this one, Alan Schwartz notes that Jack-
son's approach, which Schwartz labels as "traditional," begins after a firm experiences financial
distress, which includes a conflict among creditors, See Alan Schwartz, The Law and Economics
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy (Feb. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
My suggestion, explained below, is that one should not begin analysis with the assumption that
there is debt. It necessarily follows, of course, that one should not begin analysis with the as-
sumption that there is conflict among creditors.
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debtor. To the extent that law provides such relief, even where con-
tract does not and where a debtor could otherwise satisfy all her obli-
gations, the law permits an obligation to go unsatisfied. This too is
bankruptcy law at a basic level.
Part II questions whether there are any other basic elements of
bankruptcy law. The discussion suggests that no extensive set of spe-
cial procedural rules, traditionally understood as bankruptcy law, is
necessary or desirable given alternatives to debt as a form of obliga-
tion. The objective here is to greatly diminish what Jackson described
as the logic and limits of bankruptcy, which he viewed primarily as a
process of debt relief. The gain from such an approach is that poten-
tially superior alternatives to bankruptcy as process emerge as a
means to address financial distress in the absence of debt.
The next part of the Article, Part III, further disaggregates the
accepted notion of "bankruptcy law" and moves to another set of issues
commonly referred to as bankruptcy issues. When investors provide
capital in the form of debt, the Bankruptcy Code governs the distribu-
tion of assets in bad-state outcomes. As Part II demonstrates, were
business investment, typically in a corporation, to take some other
form, the bankruptcy process would be unnecessary or irrelevant.
Still, social welfare depends importantly on investment incentives
that are based on anticipation of distributions in bad-state outcomes.
Analysis of these incentives and distributions is important, and such
analysis is offered, even as isolated from bankruptcy as a process. The
analysis concentrates on two topics that I have addressed in prior
work-the absolute priority rule and the accelerated resolution of fi-
nancial distress. The debate about what is commonly called absolute
priority turns largely on whether holders of junior claims or interests
should receive any return from an insolvent debtor if holders of senior
claims are not paid in full. Anticipation of a payment to juniors, even
where high-priority claims are not fully satisfied, can in some cases
lead the juniors to behave as better agents for investors collectively,
while in other circumstances the effect can be quite the opposite. This
tradeoff, though contentious, is well established. Relatively neglected,
by contrast, is the role of accelerated resolution of financial distress,
which has the potential to cut the Gordian knot and provide the bene-
fits of absolute priority deviations with few of the potential costs.
Analysis of these topics reveals that the prospect of financial distress
as a consequence of fixed obligations can be fundamental to an optimal
capital structure even though debt itself is not. Other matters of cor-
porate debtors as well as the treatment of individual debtors are left
for the larger project of which this Article is a part.
20021 1665
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As a contribution for discussion at a symposium, this short Ar-
ticle can hardly be comprehensive within its broad scope. My goal here
is merely to provide a framework for a more comprehensive analysis
(that will in due course form a monograph). Some components of such
analysis already exist, provided by my own earlier work and by that of
others. Citations are provided along the way, but I suffer no illusion
that I have been complete, and I apologize in advance to those whose
work has been omitted.
As a final observation by way of introduction, I want to com-
ment briefly on the place of this work in the Symposium for which this
Article was prepared: "Convergence on Delaware: Corporate Bank-
ruptcy and Corporate Governance." The symposium title represents a
broad concept that I have liberally interpreted as an observation about
connections between bankruptcy law and corporate law, the latter so
closely identified with Delaware. This piece takes (what I perceive as)
an invitation to draw connections and attempts to draw them down to
the most basic levels of private law and then, to a limited extent, to
trace them back up the complexity hierarchy.
I. BANKRUPTCY AS FUNDAMENTAL LAW
Viewed from the appropriate perspective, bankruptcy can be
seen as part of the law's most basic fabric. Many important property,
contract, and tort topics are essentially bankruptcy topics.
Before I provide some illustrations, I will take some license
with the terms "bankruptcy" and "bankruptcy law." For specialists,
"bankruptcy" refers to a set of federal procedures codified in title 11 of
the United States Code. To others, "bankruptcy" means a debtor with
insufficient assets to repay his obligations (what specialists refer to as
"insolvency"). I want to adopt a different definition. Unless otherwise
specified, when I refer generically to "bankruptcy," as in a "bank-
ruptcy issue," I mean to refer to any law that affects the distribution of
assets in satisfaction of mutually incompatible obligations or any law
that relieves an obligation that could otherwise have been satisfied.
The term would thus include state procedures that would govern in-
solvency in the absence of the federal process as well as the state sub-
stantive priority laws on real estate mortgages and on security inter-
ests in personal property. Even these are not the limit of
"bankruptcy," however, as I mean the term.
The goal is to strip away traditional labels and common under-
standings to reach underlying substance. In doing so, I also hope that
I have met the challenge (or will in a fuller treatment of this work)
posed by Alan Schwartz, who commented on an earlier draft of this
1666 [Vol. 55:1661
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Article at the Convergence Symposium. Schwartz accepted the taxon-
omy that I propose but asked for an explanation of how the new cate-
gorization scheme contributes to academic discourse.
My claim of a contribution is two-fold. First there is a peda-
gogical advantage to the common classification of like concepts. That
is, good classification makes difficult problems easier to solve. Second,
a recharacterization of a problem may spark a new or at least a more
lucid and more productive approach to that problem. So, for example,
there is an analysis below of the contract doctrine on substantial per-
formance and material breach. This analysis characterizes the doc-
trine as a bankruptcy doctrine and, as such, one that can be tested
against a standard bankruptcy metric of over- and underinvestment
incentives, something that, to my knowledge, no prior scholarship has
attempted. 10 The claim is not that I have provided here any particu-
larly innovative analysis of insolvency-driven investment incentives.
Rather, the point is that standard contract analysis of the substantial
performance and material breach doctrine overlooks these incentives
because the standard analysis treats the doctrine as one devoted to a
determination of excuse from performance rather than, properly, as
bankruptcy doctrine.
A. Property Law as Bankruptcy Law
The central legal concept for a capitalist economy is that of pri-
vate property. This premise is reflected, for example, in the public dis-
cussion of the move from communism to capitalism by the former So-
viet republics and related states. What these nations need, it is often
said, is private property. What is meant, I believe, is not merely that
an individual should have a right to exclude others from her home and
possessions. This aspect of property undoubtedly offers significant en-
hancements to human dignity but would not of itself create an engine
of development. Instead, what is meant primarily in this context by a
need for private property is the need to provide assurances that indi-
viduals can capture for themselves the benefits of effort. Private prop-
erty serves simply when it, for example, prevents government confis-
cation of a crop.1"
In a market economy, property law plays another, subtler but
essential role as well. Property law not only holds barbarians at the
gate, it is also an arbiter among innocents. Every first-year law stu-
10. At least my recent search of the law literature and the economics literature revealed
nothing on point.
11. In an economy that includes taxation-that is, in all economies-even this simplest
form of private property is not pure, but rather one of degree.
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dent is familiar with one or another case of a landowner who conveys
the same parcel to two different buyers. 12 The question presented is
who owns the land. The answer is (typically) the first to file in the
public real estate records. Unsaid, or at least underappreciated, is
that this paradigmatic property law case is, in essence, a paradigmatic
bankruptcy case. The outcome is interesting if, perhaps only if, the
original landowner is unable fully to satisfy the conflicting obligations
she has created. Otherwise one buyer would receive the land while the
other would receive alternative compensation. There would be no
harm. The rule that awards the land to the first publicly to file-along
with the Uniform Commercial Code's similar rule for conflicting secu-
rity interests in personalty-is important because the rule allows a
purchaser who has provided public notice to count on her ownership
interest even if she cannot rely on the seller.
This resolution of such a conflict is important, in particular, for
a modern economy. As Karl Llewellyn said in a somewhat different
context, "sane" law must go beyond mere notions of passing "title" to
property and account for the fact that a modern transaction rarely "re-
sembles that of three hundred years ago: where the whole transaction
can be accomplished at one stroke, shifting possession along with title,
no strings being left behind-as in a cash purchase of an overcoat
worn home."13 Although he did not say so, the "sane" law that Lle-
wellyn called for to address the strings left behind is, at its heart, sane
bankruptcy law.
In more recent scholarship, there has been an interesting dis-
cussion about the meaning of property law. Tom Merrill and Henry
Smith, for example, champion the "in rem" nature of property rights
as salient and observe, as I have here, that property law is essential in
its ability to foster reliance. 14 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraak-
man focus particularly on the role of notice in property law, 15 as I have
here, and in a related context argue that corporate law-long consid-
ered a set of contract default rules-serves primarily the property law
12. See, e.g., Lessee of Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41 (1837), a principal case found in
CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW (2d ed. 1985).
13. Karl N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159,
167 (1938).
14. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 773, 783-89 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in
Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360-66 (2001).
15. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verifiability: Un-
derstanding the Law's Restrictions on Divided Rights (Sept. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
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function of asset segregation in the face of inconsistent claims. 16 These
are generally helpful developments. These developments are also spe-
cifically helpful to my theme here, as the conception of property law
advanced is a conception of property law as bankruptcy law.
B. The Contract-Bankruptcy Interface
Another example from a first-year law course illustrates the in-
terface between contract and bankruptcy. Consider the doctrine of
substantial performance and material breach. Where this doctrine is
applicable, a party to a contract who substantially performs can de-
mand performance, or an expectation remedy, from her counterparty.
An insubstantial breach entitles the counterparty to damages, but not
to walk away from the contract. By comparison, if a party materially
breaches (does not substantially perform), the counterparty is free to
disregard the contract and may withhold his own performance with
impunity.
The line between substantial and insubstantial performance-
or between immaterial and material breach-is not a bright one, and
courts struggle over the distinction. If a party anticipates that what is
in fact only a minor breach will relieve her counterparty of any obliga-
tion under the contract, she may invest too much in precaution to pre-
vent breach or invest too little in reliance on the counterparty's per-
formance. Precaution and reliance are central economic justifications
for contract enforcement. 17 Thus, there can be much at stake.
Section 241 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts describes
factors that courts consider when determining whether a breach is
material. The first factor listed is not surprising: "the extent to which
the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably
expected."'18 This factor may not be particularly helpful, as anyone who
speaks English would implicitly know that a greatly injurious breach
is likely to be a "material" one, but the relevance of the factor is
straightforward. The second factor listed may require more thought:
"the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated
for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived."'19 Why, one
might ask, does the availability of compensation matter in a determi-
nation of whether a breach is or is not "material"? One might imagine
16. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
110 YALE L.J. 387, 390-93 (2000).
17. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Effi-
cient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 646-50 (1988).




that the question of materiality would be prior to that of compensa-
tion. If a material breach is a greatly injurious breach, as the Restate-
ment's first factor suggests, then compensation could be available, or
not, for either a material or an immaterial breach. Preanalytic intui-
tion might suggest that it is unfair to favor a breaching party who will
not make good on his end of bargain, but the law does not generally
cancel obligations owed to those who cannot repay debts. Therefore, it
is not immediately apparent why an insolvent party should be singled
out for unfavorable treatment under a definition of materiality.
This conundrum evaporates once one recognizes that the doc-
trine of substantial performance and material breach is in large part a
bankruptcy doctrine. To see this, consider the consequences of a con-
tract rule that never released a party from her obligation, absent her
counterparty's permission, regardless of how egregious the counter-
party's breach. Where damages from breach would be fully compensa-
tory, this rule could be ideal, as it would protect the parties' respective
reliance interests and thus yield proper investment (at least to the ex-
tent that expectation damages can generally do so). That is, the
breaching party would have to pay for her breach as well as any sub-
sequent breach but could count on the return performance for which
she contracted. Even if an initial breach portended future breaches,
therefore, the victim of breach ultimately would be made whole and
both the victim and party in breach would receive the benefits of their
bargain. In reality, however, even if damages awards are, or could be
made, fully compensatory on average, the risk of insolvency is a natu-
ral part of life's variability. The law can address, but cannot eliminate,
such variability. A rule that permitted an insolvent party to demand
performance despite its incapacity or unwillingness to perform in turn
could pervert investment incentives in various ways, one of which
would be an insolvent party's incentive to continue a contractual pro-
ject even if such continuation is inefficient.
The insolvent party's perverse continuation incentive would
stem from her hope that the product of her counterparty's perform-
ance would restore the party to solvency. In that event, however
unlikely, the party could then pay the counterparty in full for such
performance and retain any excess value. The insolvent party would,
by necessity, otherwise renege, at least in part. Under these condi-
tions, an insolvent party would favor the continuation of even poor
projects. In contrast, a fully solvent party to a contract for a project
that had a negative net present value would be more likely to repudi-
ate the contract rather than commit itself to pay for its counterparty's
performance, a commitment that, by hypothesis, it could and would
have to satisfy.
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The doctrine of substantial performance and material breach-
like the related doctrine of adequate assurance 20-mitigates this ten-
dency, which the finance literature calls an insolvent party's overin-
vestment incentive, i.e., the incentive to continue a risky project de-
spite its negative net present value. 21 (Furthermore, because ex ante
investment incentives reflect anticipated ex post outcomes, the sub-
stantial performance and material breach doctrine may promote effi-
cient ex ante investment.) To the extent the doctrine turns on the
breaching party's insolvency, it essentially grants the victim of breach
a priority interest in her own performance, which she can withhold
unless the insolvent party's performance is proffered as a substitute
security. This priority scheme limits the insolvent party's ability to
gamble with other people's money in much the same way that priority
for early ordinary lenders limits a debtor's ability to gamble with other
people's money. The latter limitation is one that Alan Schwartz, alone
and with Yeon-Koo Che, has explained in the context of traditionally
understood contests among creditors for bankruptcy priority.22 The
analysis of contract law here, then, is an illustration of contract law as
bankruptcy law.
The doctrine of substantial performance and material breach,
when combined with an individual's right to discharge under bank-
ruptcy law, can also illustrate a different aspect of the contract-
bankruptcy interface. Imagine that an individual breaches a contract
in a manner that is arguably, but not clearly, material. As described
above, policy would support a determination that this breach (or any
breach) is immaterial but for the risk that the party in breach could
not fully compensate the victim of breach. If the party who breaches is
an individual, bankruptcy law (now used in the narrow, traditional
sense) affects the likelihood that the victim will be fully compensated,
as bankruptcy law affords individual debtors a nonwaivable discharge
of obligations.
20. A party who has reason to be insecure about her counterparty's performance can, under
some circumstances, withhold her own performance until she receives adequate assurance of her
counterparty's performance.
21. This use of "overinvestment" is traditional in finance literature, which directly ad-
dresses insolvency issues and which I am here attempting to integrate into contract analysis.
This use of the term is not standard for the contract literature, which reserves "overinvestment,"
or its counterpart "underinvestment," for investment prior to the realization of a state that will
determine whether performance of a contract is efficient. What I call overinvestment in this ex-
ample, the standard contract literature would call inefficient ex post performance. There is no
substantive distinction, however.
22. See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 214-18 (1989);
see also Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Ineffi-
cient Continuance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441, 441-46 (1999) (describing inefficient investment
incentives under anti-ipso facto provisions of the Bankruptcy Code).
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There are benefits from the discharge of one's obligations in
bankruptcy. Such discharge can be described as an insurance policy
for which the debtor pays in the form of higher interest rates, and
insurance is valuable to risk-averse individuals. 23 But there are costs
as well, as insurance gives rise to moral hazard. In the bankruptcy
context, moral hazard is typically described as insufficient incentive to
expend effort. 24 The present example illustrates a broader moral haz-
ard problem, as an insolvent party to a contract may choose not to re-
pudiate the contract, even where it is efficient to do so, in the hope
that the other party will remain obliged to perform. But for the avail-
able discharge in bankruptcy, the insolvent party might be forced to
internalize the cost of continuation and would repudiate the contract if
this nonperformance were optimal from a social welfare perspective.
When one considers the concomitant effects of bankruptcy law and
contract law on the incentives of parties to an executory contract,
there is a greater than commonly understood cost to the availability of
a bankruptcy discharge and the fact that the right to exercise such
discharge cannot be waived under law.
This point can be extended and generalized. The inefficiency
described stems from a party's limited liability. In the last example,
the bankruptcy discharge was the source of the limitation. If the party
were a corporation, however, the limited liability of investors under
corporate law would be the source. The inefficiency described, more-
over, is a result of a party's insolvency-driven overinvestment incen-
tive to continue with an inefficient contractual project in order to at-
tract investment from a counterparty. This perverse incentive can be
seen as the flip side of a party's insolvency-driven underinvestment
incentive to discontinue an efficient contract in order to avoid the
party's own further investment, a phenomenon described, in separate
works, by George Triantis and by Jesse Fried.25 Their observations
are, as I hope I have illustrated, only a part of the more general inter-
relationship between bankruptcy and contract law.
C. The Tort-Bankruptcy Interface
There is one well-known bankruptcy aspect of tort law. That is,
tort victims are not afforded a high priority in a contest with a debtor's
23. See Barry Adler, Ben Polak & Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A
Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 589-91 (2000).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions in Bankruptcy,
46 DUKE L.J. 517 (1996); George G. Triantis, The Effects of Insolvency and Bankruptcy on Con-
tract Performance and Adjustment, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 679 (1993).
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consensual investors. Not only do tort victims merely share bank-
ruptcy priority with unsecured creditors, they are also junior to se-
cured creditors. If the debtor is a corporation, moreover, under corpo-
rate law, shareholder liability is limited to the assets invested in the
corporation. There is a strong argument that at least pure tort vic-
tims-victims of released toxins, e.g., as opposed to victims of medical
malpractice-should have a higher priority than any consensual credi-
tor, as only the latter can negotiate over the assumption of risk. Cur-
rent law permits debtors to externalize the cost of potentially hazard-
ous conduct, and society might expect too much such conduct as a
result.26 There have thus been calls-by Hansmann and Kraakman,
for example-to eliminate limited liability for shareholders.
27
Less well understood, perhaps, is that the significance of prior-
ity in the tort regime has parallels in the discussion of contract law
above. When an insolvent party to a contract induces overinvestment
in a project at the expense of her counterparty, as described above, she
acts similarly to a tortfeasor who overinvests in activity at the expense
of an unwilling victim. In each case, the ability to gamble with some-
one else's property, life, or limb creates perverse incentives, and the
law, whether formally contract, tort, or bankruptcy, either addresses
these incentives or fails in this regard. Success or failure does not de-
pend on the labels. The connection between contract and tort incen-
tives is well established. Bob Cooter, for example, talks of the "unity"
of contract and tort.28 This unity has an important bankruptcy compo-
nent as well.
There are still other aspects to the tort-bankruptcy interface.
Consider another rule familiar to every first-year law student. One
who intentionally inflicts harm on another cannot raise a defense of
contributory negligence. 29 As a result, the tort law's disincentive for
malicious action is, not surprisingly, undiminished by any role the vic-
tim might play in the injury inflicted. The law expresses no concern
either for overdeterrence of the tortfeasor's activity or for underde-
terence of the victim's. For example, a bully will pay full damages for a
battery even if a victim foolishly wanders into the bully's path. This
rule sensibly follows a determination by society that malicious behav-
26. To prevent negative externalities, mandatory insurance laws can substitute for unlim-
ited liability. The voluntary purchase of insurance, moreover, limits the externalization of costs.
But mandatory insurance laws are not pervasive and would leave a residual amount of negative
externality, as would voluntary insurance.
27. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991).
28. See generally Cooter, supra note 1, at 2.
29. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 462 (5th ed. 1984).
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ior should be discouraged without the imposition of any needless bur-
den on potential victims. Although this tort rule does not necessarily
raise a bankruptcy issue, bankruptcy law, here meant in the narrow
sense, does support the tort rule. Bankruptcy generally discharges the
obligations of an individual debtor but does not discharge liability for
malicious acts.30 (Many nonspecialists are aware of this rule by virtue
of their inquiries about whether O.J. Simpson can use bankruptcy to
discharge his wrongful death liability; he cannot.) But for this rule,
bankruptcy law would to some extent undermine the tort law's rea-
sonable insistence on the fullest possible liability for malicious acts.
The malicious liability example may not of itself be terribly im-
portant, but it is another illustration of how bankruptcy law is broadly
intertwined with the rest of private law in small ways as well as large.
II. THE LIMITED LOGIC OF BANKRUPTCY
The vision I have described of bankruptcy law as fundamental
is a vision of a limited institution. There is only a single function
bankruptcy law must serve: the reconciliation of mutually insupport-
able obligations. This function, a logically necessary component of law
that permits the creation of such obligations, is central to bankruptcy
and central in the illustrations above, particularly to the account of
property law as bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy law serves a second func-
tion, one that many view as necessary to a beneficent society: provi-
sion of a fresh start to individual debtors.
This latter function of bankruptcy is controversial, as a manda-
tory provision of a fresh start through the discharge of obligations is
also a mandatory burden on debtor borrowing. As described above, the
discharge option can be envisioned as an insurance policy, and debtors
can be expected to pay the premium for such a policy. One might ques-
tion whether the law should require debtors to purchase insurance
against debt burden any more than individuals should be forced to
purchase other forms of insurance, such as theft insurance. But the
desirability of mandatory insurance is not implausible, particularly
where an uninsured person or her dependents might become burdens
on society. In any case, I do not wish to enter this debate here, and the
illustrations above include the fresh start as a component of bank-
ruptcy law at a basic level.
To those steeped in the intellectual discussion of bankruptcy
law, the striking omission from my short list of bankruptcy's essential
functions is the omission of bankruptcy as a process, one that solves
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2000).
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the collective-action problem among creditors. As noted in the intro-
duction above, Thomas Jackson's work, The Logic and Limits of Bank-
ruptcy, transformed the analysis of bankruptcy law into an analysis of
a collective-action problem. Creditors, Jackson reasoned, would collec-
tively lose from an unconstrained race, effectuated by individual legal
action, to grab an insolvent debtor's assets. The transaction costs of a
race could be wasteful-much as the cost of military production is of-
ten characterized as wasteful in an arms race-and, more significantly
for business debtors such as corporations, self-interested individual
creditors could, to the creditors' collective detriment, dismember or
otherwise destroy a financially burdened but economically viable going
concern. To avoid such a race, Jackson concluded, creditors would, if
only they could, agree in advance of financial distress to call off the
race in favor of a collective-debt collection process.
The bankruptcy process, in Jackson's view, reflects a hypo-
thetical bargain among creditors, who, Jackson assumes, are func-
tionally and temporally too disparate to reach an actual collective bar-
gain in advance of financial distress and may be too greedy to reach
one after. Douglas Baird, a frequent Jackson coauthor, and codevel-
oper of many ideas contained in Jackson's book, has identified an en-
tire school of bankruptcy thought as one devoted to the process of col-
lective action.3 1
The hypothetical bargain among creditors is, in essence, a
thought experiment about how holders of debt would design the ideal
bankruptcy system. There is an alternative thought experiment, how-
ever, one I want to substitute here. Although there are some parallels
between consumer and business debtors, I want to focus on how en-
trepreneurs or business firms-both "firms" for purposes of this Arti-
cle-would structure ideal investment instruments, perhaps to the ex-
clusion of debt, to perform the collective-action function that Jackson
places at the heart of bankruptcy law. This thought experiment yields
a conclusion different from Jackson's: The sole essential element of
bankruptcy law is resolution of conflicting, mutually insupportable ob-
ligations. Because firms can, through investment design, both retain
the benefits of debt and avoid the collective-action problem (except in
the atypical case of substantial tort liability), firms need not issue ob-
ligations that will conflict, even contingently. Thus, a collective-action
process need not be an element of bankruptcy law at all, much less the
central element. A firm that issued debt alternatives would not resolve
financial crises in the same way that a debt-laden firm would, but this




fact does not mean that such a firm would necessarily benefit from a
bankruptcy process. Indeed, given the options available to firms, the
collective-action problem among creditors may be seen as a solution
rather than a problem.
A. A World Without Debt
The supposed benefits of bankruptcy as a solution to a creditor
collective-action problem can be explained with a simple syllogism.
Debtors benefit from the issuance of debt to multiple creditors. The
benefits of such issuance are threatened by a creditor collective-action
problem. A solution to the collective-action problem such as that pro-
vided by the bankruptcy process, corporate reorganization in particu-
lar, is beneficial to debtors. This syllogism is simple, but false. Al-
though it is possible to characterize my objection to this syllogism in a
number of ways, I will focus here (for now) on the first premise: that
debtors benefit from the issuance of debt to multiple creditors.
Debtors may benefit from the issuance of fixed obligations to
multiple investors, but these fixed obligations need not be debt obliga-
tions. Functionally, debt is composed of two parts: the debtor's obliga-
tion to pay a sum certain at a time certain, and the debtholder's right
to enforce such obligation with an individual collection remedy. In the
standard account of debt and bankruptcy, the first component of
debt-fixed obligations-is a benefit, while the second component-
individual enforcement-is a harm. So my thought experiment begins
with a concededly simpleminded question: If debt consists of beneficial
fixed obligations and a harmful individual enforcement right, and if
bankruptcy law exists to remedy the harm of the individual enforce-
ment right, then why can a firm not simply issue fixed obligations
without an individual enforcement right and thus save itself the po-
tential trouble of a bankruptcy process? That is, why issue the bitter
with the sweet? Although this question is straightforward, there does
not seem to be a satisfactory answer, at least not one that favors the
bankruptcy process as a solution to a collective-action problem.
To elaborate, 32 a firm may rationally issue fixed obligations be-
cause those obligations may simultaneously allow managers to hold a
significant portion of a firm's residual claim and discipline managers,
who face the consequences of payment default, perhaps including dis-
missal. The result may be harder working managers. 33 A firm may ra-
32. For an account that tracks this section and then expands the discussion, see generally
Barry E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811 (1994).
33. This account is a simplification of a complicated issue. Compare Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
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tionally issue its fixed obligations to a large number of investors be-
cause no single lender would be willing to provide all financing at all
times. (This supposition might be true of large firms.) Or a firm might
rationally prefer to have multiple financing sources so as not to vest in
any lender the opportunity to behave strategically with respect to sub-
sequent loans that only an existing lender, given better information,
could efficiently provide.
34
The world I envision, therefore, is a world with fixed obliga-
tions that a firm might issue to numerous investors. I imagine elimi-
nating only a single feature of traditional debt: the right of a fixed-
obligation claimant individually to collect. This one feature is signifi-
cant because it is the feature of debt that creates the collective-action
problem and the purported need for a bankruptcy process.
My approach is simple. The justification for bankruptcy is the
need to prevent individual creditor collection. I imagine a world in
which firms issue obligations like debt in every respect except the one
that creates the need for bankruptcy. I then ask what might be gained
and what might be lost. What might be gained is the avoidance of
bankruptcy expense, or other restructuring expense, for firms that is-
sue fixed obligations to multiple investors. This expense can be sub-
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312-20 (1976) (noting the residual claimant's incentive to maxi-
mize wealth), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 650, 653 (1984) (suggesting that managers who have a substantial investment in
their firms may be reluctant to invest the firm's assets wisely if the investment in question is
risky). Moreover, the market for corporate control, while costly, can substitute, at least to some
extent, for debt as a disciplinary device. See, e.g., Peter Dodd, The Market for Corporate Control: A
Review of the Evidence, 1 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 6 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback,
The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983). Suffice it to say
here that it may be rational for some firms to invest their managers with a substantial residual
interest and to have those managers face the risk of financial ruin for failure to meet fixed obli-
gations.
34. Virtually all bankruptcy scholarship assumes that large firms have many lenders. As
Douglas Diamond illustrates, this assumption is not theoretically inevitable. See Douglas W.
Diamond, Corporate Capital Structure: The Control Roles of Bank and Public Debt with Taxes
and Costly Bankruptcy, FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. Q., Spring 1994, at 30-31 (describ-
ing circumstances under which bank debt is preferable to public debt). Even a large firm could
borrow from a single institution, which could in turn have diversified investors. It is plausible,
nonetheless, to assume that many large firms will efficiently have multiple sources of debt capi-
tal, perhaps because a single institutional lender to a large firm would have large administrative
expenses. Id. at 30. Moreover, a single lender or its managers, like a large shareholder or its
managers, exert a powerful influence over a debtor, one that might not be in the debtor's best
interests. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional In-
vestor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 826-27 (1992) (describing conflicts of interests facing institu-
tional money managers); cf. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 261 (1994) (arguing that the presence of multiple par-
ties with power can reduce side payments to any one such party); Patrick Bolton & David S.
Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1, 1-3
(1996) (arguing that multiple creditors may minimize strategic management default).
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stantial, at least under current bankruptcy law, which divides an in-
solvent firm's value through claimant negotiations that more than oc-
casionally deteriorate into a litigated imbroglio. 35 Given the desire to
protect insolvent but viable firms, it is not clear that anything signifi-
cant might be lost from the elimination of individual collection rights.
Elimination of debt, and with it the individual creditor's right
to collect, might cost little because there is an alternative collective
remedy of which fixed-obligation claimants could avail themselves. In
earlier work, I have argued that, absent legal and other impediments,
a firm could replace debt with a financial instrument analogous to pre-
ferred equity.36 This substitution could create what I call a "Chame-
leon Equity" firm. Such a firm would retain the benefits of fixed obli-
gations but would avoid the negative consequences of creditor
coordination failure-notably postdefault dismemberment of a viable
firm-by eliminating individual creditor collection.
In the simplest Chameleon Equity firm, insolvency and un-
cured default would eliminate the preinsolvency common-equity class
and would convert the lowest priority fixed-obligation class to common
equity. This transformation might follow a grace period during which
a firm's outside directors could replace management in an attempt to
cure the default that triggered conversion. 7 A Chameleon Equity
transformation would not occur, then, until the capital market sig-
naled a firm's insolvency through a refusal to refinance.38 Posttrans-
35. For an estimate of bankruptcy reorganization's direct costs, see Lawrence A. Weiss,
Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285,
285 (1990) (estimating that the direct costs of bankruptcy average three percent of the firms'
book value of debt plus the market value of the equity). For what is likely the limiting estimate
of reorganization's indirect costs, from one prominent case, see David M. Cutler & Lawrence H.
Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-
Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON. 157 (1988) (estimating costs in the billions of dollars). The
magnitude of these costs, particularly the indirect costs, is debated. See, e.g., Gregor Andrade &
Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Lev-
eraged Transactions That Became Distressed, 53 J. FIN. 1443 (1998). There is little question,
however, that the costs of reorganization are more than trivial, at least for any firm that is both
economically and financially distressed.
36. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy,
45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 323-33 (1993).
37. Such a grace period would limit the risk of collusion between the managers and the pre-
transformation junior creditor class, which otherwise might, on the side, bribe the managers to
have even a solvent firm default.
38. If neither the old managers nor the newly charged special-purpose managers could cure
a triggering default, then the most likely reason would be insolvency, which would justify the
transformation. Consequently, managers of a Chameleon Equity firm might not have sufficient
incentive to transform a firm early enough. But managerial desire to avoid default until the last
possible moment, a desire that can be mitigated by covenants with investors, or through prefer-
ence rules, as described in Part III of this Article, would not distinguish a Chameleon Equity
firm from a traditional firm under the current bankruptcy regime.
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formation, any remaining preferred equity class would survive unaf-
fected. At any given time, management would represent the then-
current common equity class and could be summarily replaced by that
class. 39 Investors could adopt the Chameleon Equity structure actu-
ally, rather than hypothetically, through their choice to invest in a
firm that has enforceably eschewed traditional debt, perhaps by initial
charter.
40
Thus, for a simple firm, with one class of common equity and
one class of general creditors, the general creditors would become the
equity class and automatically receive securities worth the firm's en-
tire going-concern value. The general creditors collectively, as the new
equityholders, or purchasers therefrom, would also have control of the
firm, which they could operate or liquidate as they wished. (Perhaps, a
common first step would be to replace the managers that had just so
spectacularly failed the prior equity class.) There would be no need for
a court to provide a collective remedy because there would be no indi-
vidual remedy in the first place. Nothing else would have to change.
In a more complex firm, one with a variety of fixed obligation
priority classes, even after a default triggered a Chameleon Equity
transformation, no judicial intervention would be required to preserve
the highest priority obligations (which could include asset-based se-
cured obligations). After the firm, relieved of its most junior obliga-
tions, cured any payment default on its senior obligations, the senior
obligations would retain their priority and would survive complete
with fixed claims of original maturity. This process would free the firm
to adopt a tiered hierarchy of "onion skin" priority classes that would
keep the firm almost eternally solvent and almost eternally subject to
39. This insight, to the extent it is an insight, is built on a discussion of collective action
among bondholders in Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232,
239-40 (1987).
40. Others have seen that a debtor corporation serves as a nexus for agreement among
creditors. See, e.g., Robert A. Haugen & Lemma W. Senbet, Bankruptcy and Agency Costs: Their
Significance to the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure, 23 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 27,
29-31 (1988) (stating that, in the abstract, impediments to restructuring are easily eliminated
through inclusion of simple provisions in corporate charters and bond indentures); Robert C.
Merton, The Financial System and Economic Performance, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 263, 283-85
(1990) (suggesting that options could eliminate the need for bankruptcy); Randal C. Picker, Se-
curity Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645, 647-48, 669-75 (1992)
(arguing that secured credit mitigates the collective-action problem); Roe, supra note 39, at 232,
250-69 (arguing that prohibition under section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act restricts con-
tractual resolution of financial distress). But none of these contributions has recognized the po-
tential completely to solve the collective-action problem without a substantial restriction on the
capital structure flexibility available to firms that rely on the bankruptcy process to cure any col-
lective-action problem. For example, an all-equity capital structure solves the collective-action
problem but does not preserve the advantages of fixed obligations. This observation is not meant
to diminish the contributions of others, but simply to note an advance. Cf. infra note 43.
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significant fixed obligations. In the end, every claimant would get the
priority for which it contracted. (Tort law could award tort victims a
Chameleon Equity obligation, rather than a creditor's claim, of any
priority, including the highest.) Although there would be questions of
default and liability, as there are now in traditional firms, there would
be no postinsolvency restructuring expense. A Chameleon Equity firm
would have to bear the initial transaction cost of adopting the Chame-
leon Equity structure. But it is difficult to imagine that this cost would
be more than a trivial addition to the current cost of contracting for
corporate charters and bond covenants.41 Corporate bankruptcy, then,
seems unnecessary, at least in terms of this simple thought experi-
ment.
As I have noted previously, I am not so naive as to believe that
abolition of bankruptcy or firm selection of a Chameleon Equity struc-
ture is imminent or even possible. In my original article on Chameleon
Equity, I described a list of legal and other impediments to a Chame-
leon Equity structure. These barriers include tax, commercial, corpo-
rate, and tort law. In addition, I offered a public choice explanation for
the persistence of these impediments. 42 Nevertheless, absent artificial
constraint, a world without debt or bankruptcy, and with contractual
solutions to the collective-action problem, seems a potentially efficient
world. At the very least, such a world need not include Jackson's con-
ception of what is essential about bankruptcy. 43
41. I discuss this point in Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role
of Insolvency Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1118-19 (1994). In Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwar-
ranted Case Against Corporate Reorganization: A Reply to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IOWA L.
REV. 669, 720 (1993), the author describes these costs as "immense," because he neglects the pos-
sibility that the contracts could become standard form much like bond covenants are under the
current regime.
42. See Adler, supra note 36, at 333-41.
43. Others have seen the potential for transferring equity in satisfaction of debt or trans-
forming debt into equity. See, e.g., Merton, supra note 40, at 263, 283-85 (suggesting a debtor's
option to pay claims and retain equity in underlying assets); Note, Distress-Contingent Converti-
ble Bonds: A Proposed Solution to the Excess Debt Problem, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1857, 1869-77
(1991) (recommending a gradual transformation of debt into equity as the value of a firm de-
clines).
None of these proposals, however, attempts to decompose debt into its fixed-obligation and
individual-collection parts, and each thus fails to recognize the potential of financial instruments
stripped of individual collection rights to mimic any other feature of debt, including multiple pri-
orities, through simple decoupling. In the Merton article cited above, which was published while
my original Chameleon Equity paper was in draft, Merton suggested that a holding company
rather than an operating company might issue junk bonds so as to insulate the operating com-
pany from the burdens of such debt. If the holding company failed to purchase the bonds for the
amount owed (i.e., pay the debt), the bondholders would take the equity interest in the operating
company. The operating company would thus be spared the risk of liquidation or the need for
reorganization. But Merton did not express a broader vision of this mechanism. He noted, for
example, that the operating company would itself be subject to trade debt and that such debt
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To be sure, Chameleon Equity is not the only contractual ar-
rangement through which investors could provide for the disposition
of a firm that fails to meet its fixed obligations. As Alan Schwartz ob-
serves in his role as commentator for this Article, one can view the re-
organization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code as a set of contract de-
fault rules that, in effect, removes what is merely an ostensible
incompatibility among traditional debt obligations issued by a firm
that becomes insolvent. Thus, the reorganization provisions can serve
the same primary function as Chameleon Equity.
Schwartz's observation is perfectly correct and supports my
bankruptcy taxonomy. Schwartz's reference to default rules recognizes
that the Bankruptcy Code's reorganization provisions can be seen as
contractual, albeit implicit, terms that avoid inconsistent obligations.
As such, the reorganization provisions are not a response to any col-
lective-action problem too stubborn for contract to solve, as Jackson's
conception holds. Jackson sees bankruptcy law as a classic regulatory
response to a collective-action problem, which Jackson believes can
yield inevitably conflicting obligations. That is, in Jackson's concep-
tion, the Bankruptcy Code's reorganization provisions serve a function
similar to the property law, discussed above, which resolves ownership
disputes between two innocent buyers who have purchased from a
fraudulent seller. In contrast, my view of bankruptcy law, like
Schwartz's comment, recognizes that there is no collective-action prob-
lem. Thus, solution to a collective-action problem cannot be an essen-
tial element of bankruptcy law. The realization that neither tradi-
tional debt nor current bankruptcy law is inevitable allows one to
consider perhaps superior alternatives to traditional debt and the
Bankruptcy Code's response thereto. Such consideration is the essence
would not be jeopardized by the leverage of the holding company, but he offered no alternative to
such trade debt priority, which would exist by necessity of the scheme. To be sure, Merton might
have imagined a tiered set of holding companies, each owning another, with debt in each that
would correspond to desired priorities. These could be used to replicate a multiple-priority Cha-
meleon Equity firm, but Merton's objective was simply to show that junk bonds need not present
a liquidation risk to an operating company, and so he did not even intimate that such a tiered
structure was possible. Similarly, given his narrow purpose, Merton did not address the poten-
tial advantages, or disadvantages, of Chameleon Equity, or any other ex ante approach, over an
ex post arrangement such as an auction. These potential advantages, along with potential disad-
vantages, described below, make up a substantial part of my own earlier work on the topic. The
student note cited above, for its part, alters the nature of a fixed obligation, with a gradual con-
version of debt to equity altering priority and with it debt's disciplinary benefits.
Ironically, a reform proposal often described as roughly equivalent to Chameleon Equity, pre-
sented in Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE
L.J. 1043 (1992), lacks the essential element of Chameleon Equity, namely the elimination of
individual creditor collection. See Adler, supra note 36, at 332-33.
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of Chameleon Equity, described from the start as a thought experi-
ment, one that continues below.
B. Ex Ante Resolution of Financial Distress
Bankruptcy as an essential collective process can be dispatched
with a simple decoupling of debt's components and an elimination of
the individual collection right. The removal of individual collection
rights means that discordant creditors pose no threat to an integrated
set of debtor's assets. This does not mean, however, that no additional
remedy for financial distress is ever appropriate. Robert Rasmussen,
for example, has called for a menu of options debtors might adopt,
44
and Alan Schwartz has repeatedly counseled against attempts to fash-
ion any single set of rules for varied firms.45 Firms could simply abol-
ish debt, as I suggest, but there are alternatives, the status quo in-
cluded.
Start with the status quo. Bankruptcy law need not, in my
view, include a collective process, but in the United States, and else-
where, it does. The particular process adopted in the United States,
and in a growing number of countries, is one of structured negotia-
tions backed by judicial valuation. In brief, a debtor's bankruptcy peti-
tion stays individual creditor collection and invites the debtor's man-
agers (or, in rare cases, a trustee) to propose a reorganization plan.
The managers then seek approval from the creditors. If all creditors
accept, the plan is confirmed, and the debtor emerges from bank-
ruptcy. If some but not all classes of creditor claims accept, the bank-
ruptcy judge can confirm the plan only if she is satisfied that the dis-
senters will be compensated under the plan in accordance with
"absolute priority," that is, with no compensation for low-priority
claims unless high-priority claims are compensated in full. 46 In a reor-
ganization from which the debtor is to emerge as a going concern,
compensation under the plan typically takes the form of new claims
against or interests in the reorganized firm. Therefore, for a judge to
determine whether a plan comports with absolute priority, she ordi-
narily must determine the value of the firm.
44. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy,
71 TEx. L. REV. 51, 100-07 (1992).
45. For Schwartz's most recent admonishment, see Schwartz, supra note 9.
46. This description of the bankruptcy reorganization process is oversimplified in some re-
spects. For example, the described protection afforded high-priority creditors who dissent is in
fact afforded only to classes of creditors who fail to approve a plan by supermajority vote. Neither
this nor other details of the bankruptcy reorganization process are relevant to the current dis-
cussion, however.
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The most common suggestions for bankruptcy reform involve
replacing judicial valuation with a market-based mechanism. These
proposals rest on at least two key assumptions. The first is that abso-
lute priority matters. A more extended discussion of absolute priority
follows in Part III of this Article. For now, merely note that absolute
priority likely matters because absolute priority is largely based on
contracts among investors (with tort claims an exception). Presumably
there is a reason that parties create different priority classes, or every
firm would be financed simply with common equity. Consider, for ex-
ample, an insolvency resolution that granted creditors no greater
compensation than shareholders. Investors and managers would an-
ticipate this outcome, and the fixed-obligation benefits described above
would be lost. The result would be that the debtor would face a higher
cost of capital. The second assumption that supports market-based re-
form is that markets value capital assets at least as well as individual
judges. These assumptions are at least plausible, except perhaps with
respect to the smallest firms in the thinnest markets, and there has
thus been substantial interest in market alternatives to judicial
valuation.
The simplest market reform would be for the bankruptcy court
to conduct a cash auction for the assets of the debtor. Holders of the
debtor's prebankruptcy claims and interests would then divide the
proceeds according to absolute priority. The new owners, free from
prebankruptcy conflicts, would decide the firm's fate. This idea has
been developed by, and become associated with, Douglas Baird. 47 In an
earlier variant of Baird's proposal, Mark Roe suggested that a full-
scale auction is not necessary. He recommended that bankruptcy law
provide instead for the sale of a small portion of new interests in the
firm.48 The purchase price from such a sale would serve as the basis
for the issuance of additional new interests in exchange for prebank-
rutpcy claims and interests.
Market alternatives can be more elaborate as well. Lucian
Bebchuk followed Roe with his own issue-of-securities, market-
valuation solution. He proposed a bankruptcy process in which each
holder of a claim or interest would be granted a conditional option, ex-
ercisable in ascending order of priority. The option would entitle the
holder to buy a ratable portion of all higher priority claims or interests
47. See Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633, 633-35
(1993); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
127, 145-47 (1986). The idea was also mentioned in William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, De-
fault, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 38 (1977).
48. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 530 (1983).
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at face value unless a holder of a lower priority claim or interest exer-
cised its option to purchase the holder's own claim or interest. The op-
tions themselves would be marketable prior to the date of exercise. 49
Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, and John Moore specified how the
Bebchuk proposal could include a role for the bankruptcy court as a
guide, not to valuation, but to the determination of the firm's postre-
organization character.
50
Recently, with Ian Ayres, I suggested that bankruptcy might
employ a dilution mechanism to value a debtor. In one simplified ver-
sion of this mechanism, the court would issue new shares to senior
creditors and then just that number of additional shares, if any, to
junior creditors such that the seniors would want to sell, but neither
the juniors nor any market bidder would want to buy, the seniors'
shares at the price of the seniors' aggregate claim. In the end, senior
creditors would either own all the shares of the firm-if the debtor
were worth less than the aggregate senior claim and thus no addi-
tional shares were issued to junior creditors-or the seniors would
own shares that, after dilution by issuance to the juniors, were worth
precisely what the seniors were owed with the debtor's excess value
incorporated into the junior creditors' own shares. Either way, abso-
lute priority would be honored (and the scheme could incorporate
shareholders as well were there some chance that the value of the
debtor exceeded the aggregate of all claims, senior and junior). We be-
lieve our mechanism is an improvement over Bebchuk's in circum-
stances where junior creditors (or shareholders) face a liquidity crisis,
which is possible in thin markets.5 1
Although these proposals differ from one another in various re-
spects, each with strengths and weaknesses (the description of which
is beyond the scope of this Article),52 they share a common trait. Every
one of them provides for the division of a financially distressed firm
based on a valuation determined after the firm has become unable to
meet its obligations. In each case, this is the proposed order of events:
First, the firm defaults or declares that it will not pay; second, absent
a consensual resolution among investors, the willingness of investors
or other market participants to buy or sell determines the firm's value;
49. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 775, 781-88 (1988).
50. See Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform,
8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 523, 535 (1992); Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart & John Moore, Improving
Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 861-66 (1994).
51. Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Firms in Bankruptcy,
111 YALE L.J. 83, 96-112, 140-48 (2002).
52. For a more detailed account, see id. at 140-48; Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate
Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 347-50 (1997).
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and third, either automatically or through judicial intervention, the
firm's value is distributed to holders of claims and interests. Bank-
ruptcy reorganization employs a similar order of events, save that in
bankruptcy judicial valuation replaces market valuation in the second
step. In every case, though, a critical part of the process-satisfying
claims and interests-turns on some ex post valuation.
Inasmuch as both current bankruptcy law and so many pro-
posals for reform treat valuation as the touchstone of any bankruptcy
process, it is not surprising that valuation has come to be considered
an essential element of bankruptcy. Recall my claim, however, that
the only essential element of bankruptcy is the resolution of inconsis-
tent obligations. Ex post valuation is one method of resolution when a
debtor cannot fully satisfy its fixed obligations, but it is not the only
method. Note that a Chameleon Equity firm, -as described above, can
include multiple fixed obligations in multiple priority classes and can
honor the priority among its investors all without any attempt to ac-
complish a postdefault valuation. Instead, investors decide, ex ante, at
the time they invest, what will happen in the event the firm fails to
meet its obligations. Contract, not the court or marketplace, is con-
sulted. The transformation of a Chameleon Equity firm is thus simple
and ministerial.
The Chameleon Equity idea, therefore, is different in kind from
the market-based proposals that are by far the most common in the
bankruptcy reform debate.5 3 The difference is as stark as between ex
ante and ex post. This is not to say that Chameleon Equity's ex ante
approach logically dominates the others; it does not. Chameleon Eq-
uity works well when the investors can make accurate ex ante predic-
tions about a firm's value at the time the firm defaults without cure.
The approach works less well otherwise. For example, one might
imagine a Chameleon Equity firm with a senior and a junior fixed-
obligation priority class, each owed $100. If the firm defaults on a ma-
ture obligation and cannot cure default within contractually pre-
scribed means, then the senior class would become the sole fixed-
obligation class, with the junior fixed-obligation class transformed into
the sole common-equity class, while the former common-equity class
would be canceled. This transformation comports with absolute prior-
ity if, but only if, the value of the firm at the time is between $100 and
$200. To the extent a judicial or market ex post valuation could correct
any mistaken ex ante prediction of firm value at the time of default,
an ex post approach has potential advantages over an ex ante method.
53. See Adler, supra note 52, at 351-57.
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But any such potential advantage comes at a price that makes the ad-
vantage merely potential.
If information were free, adherence to absolute priority would
be trivial as contention over value, and thus over distribution entitle-
ment, would simply vanish. Indeed, many of private law's most diffi-
cult, and most interesting, legal issues would disappear. This observa-
tion is not limited to bankruptcy questions, though it applies to them
as well. For example, as noted above, the design of contract remedy is
important because remedy influences investment incentives. 54 Such
incentives matter only because investment itself-e.g., in effort level-
is often not verifiable, except at a prohibitive expense and is thus non-
contractible. Similarly, a firm's valuation may be considered nonveri-
fiable. Valuation depends on many subtle factors, both those specific
to the firm and those general to the economy at large. A market proc-
ess can aggregate information among participants (bidders) but only
at some cost.
Sale costs for public offerings are significant, as much as al-
most 5% of even large public offerings 55 and as much as 20% for
smaller offerings 5 6-- and this substantial cost despite competition
among underwriters. The cost may well be attributable to the cost of
information generation and distribution, without which (for fear of a
lemons problem) 57 bidders would not bid, or would not bid much.58 For
a debtor in bankruptcy, the costs of market valuation might vary with
the particular method chosen, but the process would not be costless
even assuming, counterfactually, that the valuation result would be
perfectly accurate. The valuation cost must be weighed in the balance
when one compares market solutions to judicial valuation and to an ex
ante solution such as Chameleon Equity, which eliminates ex post
valuation entirely.
As mentioned, the claim here is not that an ex ante approach to
bankruptcy resolution dominates ex post valuation. There are poten-
54. See Craswell, supra note 17, at 646-50 and accompanying text.
55. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Alternative Methods for Raising Capital: Rights Versus Un-
derwritten Offerings, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 273, 277 (1977) (analyzing SEC data to compare underwrit-
ing costs with rights offerings costs).
56. See Jay R. Ritter, The Costs of Going Public, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 269, 272 (1987).
57. Compare the discussion on public offerings with the famous Akerlof "lemons" problem.
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW.
U. L. REV. 542, 570-72 (1990) (reviewing law and finance literature); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1515-24 (1989) (same); Marcel Kahan,
The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 565, 580-83 (1995)
(same).
58. See, e.g., Kenneth R. French & Robert E. McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs, and the
Process of Competition, 57 J. Bus. 417, 431-32 (1984) (showing that without information, buyers
will purchase at a price that is lower than the expected value of the good).
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tial costs and potential benefits to either approach. The commentator
for this Article, Alan Schwartz, recommends that these trade-offs be
formalized in a model that demonstrates how savings may be realized,
and under what conditions, from the various bankruptcy alternatives.
This recommendation is a good one and poses a challenge that I will
undertake in subsequent work.
The very plausibility of an ex ante approach such as Chame-
leon Equity demonstrates that ex post valuation is not an essential
component of bankruptcy. This distinction between ex ante and ex
post is not merely semantic. Insolvency resolution, while significant,
may not present the most important challenges to market economies
in the United States or in other developed countries because any of the
approaches discussed may work tolerably well. In developing coun-
tries, however, markets tend to be unreliable and the judiciary per-
haps less so. Therefore, an ex ante solution, which requires no market
valuation and only ministerial judicial involvement, may uniquely
permit the efficient allocation of capital.
C. The Endogeneity of Process and Capital Structure
The debate over the bankruptcy reorganization process and the
various reform proposals begins with the premise that there will be
some opportunity for a collective insolvency resolution. Ex post solu-
tions rely on a stay of individual collection until the debtor's value can
be determined and distributed. An ex ante solution, such as Chame-
leon Equity, requires no stay because there is no individual collection
right in the first instance. In either case, a firm will be kept alive at
least until those who would benefit from a proper disposition of the
firm's assets can make a collective decision. So even if the possibility
of an ex ante solution implies that valuation is not an essential bank-
ruptcy element, there remains the impression that collective action is
essential-a false impression.
A misapprehension of financial economics gives rise to the in-
tuition that a proper insolvency system must screen firms that should
live from those that should die. It is an axiom of finance theory that a
firm's financial health-its ability to pay its debts-is not synonymous
with the firm's economic health-its ability efficiently to provide goods
or services. It is commonly observed, therefore, that a debt-laden firm
can suffer financial distress while maintaining economic viability.
Thus, if insolvency provided no clue as to a firm's viability, legal rules
that permitted a firm's immediate dismemberment at the hands of un-
constrained creditors might waste much value. But a firm's insol-
vency, as signaled by the firm's default on its debt, may provide a
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strong clue as to the firm's viability. Financial distress need not ran-
domly befall good and bad firms alike. Because investors choose an
initial capital structure, they may adopt a debt component that ren-
ders unlikely the simultaneous occurrence of insolvency and viability.
Consequently, investors might well prefer insolvency rules that chan-
nel few resources into distinguishing firms that should continue from
those that should liquidate, even if the result is routine liquidation.
This observation, taken from my prior work,5 9 provides a the-
ory of corporate insolvency that integrates investors' capital-structure
and insolvency-rule decisions. A combination of preferred-equity in-
struments, such as Chameleon Equity, and traditional debt allows
dispersed investors to enjoy the advantages of fixed obligations with-
out fear of liquidation while a firm is likely to be viable and permits
these investors to benefit from liquidation through creditor competi-
tion for assets when the firm is likely to be inviable. Small failures,
perhaps from independent exogenous shocks, might impair a viable
debtor's common equity or even, eventually, some of its junior Chame-
leon Equity classes. At some point, however, when the debtor has dis-
sipated all the value contained in its Chameleon Equity classes and
defaults on its traditional debt, one might safely assume that the fail-
ures are systemic and that the debtor is no longer viable. 60 That is, the
size of a financial failure may imply its cause, and so when a firm's
capital is impaired beyond a certain point, one might safely conclude
that the firm could efficiently dissolve into its creditors' hands.
The bankruptcy reorganization process would interfere with
this design by protecting even those firms that should not continue.
Alternatives that would protect insolvent firms could similarly inter-
fere. Bankruptcy law or an alternative means of firm protection may
save firms that are viable ex post, despite the ex ante likelihood of in-
viability. But the cost of screening must be borne by investors in all
insolvent firms. These costs would include the direct or indirect costs
of formal reorganization, market valuation, or a potential continuation
bias by those who may control a firm and earn private benefits from
its existence. No method of insolvency resolution can avoid all these
potential expenses. The occasional successful rescue of a viable firm
may not justify this ubiquitous cost.
Once one sees insolvency process and capital structure as en-
dogenous choices, 61 it becomes apparent that there may be no need for
59. See Adler, supra note 52, at 367-75.
60. See Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, 4 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 13, 24 (1991) (discussing losses that are exogenous and endogenous to management).
61. Although others have observed a connection between capital structure and potential
value, as far as I know no one has made the further connection to insolvency process design.
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bankruptcy or any alternative process to provide any collective insol-
vency remedy. I do not believe, as Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmus-
sen apparently do, that important creditor-collection conflicts rarely
arise in our modern economy. 62 (Baird and Rasmussen note that firms
like Enron, for example, would disappear in an orderly fashion even
outside of bankruptcy. But in other recent large bankruptcies, a po-
tential grab race was evident as debtors apparently feared that credi-
tors or lessors would take planes off runways, in Swissair's case, or
evict a retailer from its storefronts, in Kmart's case.) Rather my con-
tention is that creditor-collection conflicts can be a solution rather
than a problem.
III. FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS
The principles that narrow the usefulness of bankruptcy as a
process do not limit the importance of insolvency as a concept. Bank-
ruptcy law need do no more than resolve conflicts among mutually in-
supportable claims. Contract can provide obligations that address in-
solvency as a contingency and thus that do not conflict. Nevertheless,
contractual resolution might rationally permit conflict that investors
could, even from an ex ante perspective, happily leave to a creditor
grab race. These are the propositions I hope to have supported thus
far (albeit briefly).
There is, however, an important set of issues that I have not
addressed. These require one to consider bad-state outcomes and how
the allocation of loss from such outcomes affects incentives of investors
and their agents. The questions raised are commonly referred to as
Douglas Diamond has lamented a lack of integration of corporate insolvency theories. See Dia-
mond, supra note 34, at 11-13. As I have, Diamond discusses the role of ex ante structure in con-
tinuation decisions, but Diamond's focus is on whether bank debt or public debt maximizes firm
value given the presumably higher cost of, and better continuation decision provided by, the for-
mer. There are, in addition, numerous articles that discuss variations in initial capital structure
with variations in insolvency costs, including costs from an inefficient continuation decision. See,
e.g., Michael J. Alderson & Brian L. Betker, Liquidation Costs and Capital Structure, 39 J. FIN.
ECON. 45, 47-49 (1995) (collecting and discussing earlier work); D. Bruce Johnsen, The
Quasi-Rent Structure of Corporate Enterprise: A Transaction Cost Theory, 44 EMORY L.J. 1277,
1354-56 (1995); Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. FIN.
567, 576-82 (1988) (describing theories of debt and equity). Michael Jensen has suggested that
firms adjust their capital structures to reduce the costs of postinsolvency workouts, although he
takes as given the rule that would govern absent postinsolvency agreement among creditors. See
Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy, 2 J. APPLIED
COP. FIN. 35, 41-43 (1989). My focus here is on the simultaneous ex ante decision concerning
capital structure and the rule that would govern absent postinsolvency agreement among inves-
tors.
62. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003) (manuscript on file with author).
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bankruptcy questions because they stem from bankruptcy law as it ex-
ists as opposed to what it could be in an idealized world where agree-
ment could greatly limit the opportunity for incompatible obligations
that are the essential core of bankruptcy. The reason not to tag these
questions of incentive with the "bankruptcy" label in the taxonomy I
adopt here is that exclusion from such characterization focuses atten-
tion on the more universal importance of the questions, which must be
answered regardless of whether the allocation of loss is provided by
the traditional bankruptcy process or by some contractual alternative
that may avoid even the possibility of incompatible obligations. Labels
aside, my goal is to isolate incentive questions from process questions
so that one may analyze each independently. As I have attempted to
show in prior work, 63 an efficient insolvency process, whatever that
may be in context, can be adapted to include whatever incentives are
desirable.
A vast literature has been devoted to the analysis of ex ante in-
centives from anticipation of bad-state outcomes. It is not possible in
this short Article comprehensively even to survey that literature. In-
stead, I will identify two-areas that either have received much atten-
tion or, in my view, should, and I will provide a brief glimpse into the
relevant issues. The areas I will discuss are absolute priority, a topic
that has attracted great attention, but could afford to be refocused,
and the timing of financial distress, a topic that, in my view, deserves
more attention than it has received. There is, moreover, a connection
between the two topics, as accelerated resolution of financial distress
can obviate the need, if any, for payments to holders of junior claims
or interests where senior claims are not fully satisfied. Other issues
for corporate debtors as well as the treatment of individual debtors, no
less fundamental, are left for a broader work.6 4
A. Absolute Priority
There is general agreement that the bankruptcy reorganization
process in the United States does not strictly honor absolute priority.
Deviations are not always large, 65 but the direct and indirect costs of
the reorganization contest over even small amounts can be signifi-
63. See Adler, supra note 41, at 1109-11.
64. For a description of another issue that confronts a corporate debtor, see, e.g., Barry E.
Adler, An Equity Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1993)
(arguing that firms might issue general rather than secured debt to reduce the agency costs of
the relationship between shareholders and managers). For some ideas on consumer bankruptcy,
see, e.g., Adler, Polak & Schwartz, supra note 23.
65. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 35, at 294-95 (describing payments to equity where creditors
are not paid in full).
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cant.66 In particular, the prospect of even a small absolute priority vio-
lation may induce holders of junior claims and interests to push for an
inefficient reorganization of an inviable debtor because distributions
in reorganizations tend to take the form of new claims or interests,
which a judge may mistakenly value in favor of the juniors, while dis-
tributions in liquidations tend to be in cash, the value of which cannot
be mistaken. 67 Holders of junior and senior claims or interests could,
absent transaction costs, settle on an efficient resolution of the
debtor's affairs-whether that is continuation or liquidation-
whatever the potential or actual judicial resolution. But negotiation
difficulty and the prospect of breakdown that may have led the debtor
to bankruptcy in the first place can plague settlement after the reor-
ganization and thus favor the judicial outcome of the bankruptcy proc-
ess. As noted above, moreover, deviations in absolute priority-
including those that result from ex post renegotiation-upset initial
bargains and thus potentially undermine efficient allocations such as
early-investor priority. The result would be an increase in a debtor's
ex ante cost of capital. Consequently, many of the bankruptcy reform
proposals discussed in the prior part of this Article were devoted to
protection of absolute priority.
Although no one argues that bankruptcy law should abandon
contractual priority altogether, not everyone is sanguine about the ad-
visability of strict adherence. A substantial contingent of bankruptcy
scholars, and many bankruptcy judges, favor liberal reorganization
even though they might concede that many debtors could not be reor-
ganized at all were absolute priority inflexibly enforced. These schol-
ars and jurists would argue that reorganizations are socially desirable,
even if liquidation would yield a higher return to investors, because
reorganization means, at least for a time, continued employment and
community preservation. Others would contend, however, that antici-
pated violations of absolute priority for the protection of inviable firms
would lead to an increased ex ante cost of capital, ultimately to the
aggregate detriment, not benefit, of employees and their communi-
ties. 68 This debate is, in essence, one over the large question of
whether markets are agents of social welfare and is therefore not eas-
ily settled.
Another argument against strict absolute priority comes from
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, who suggest that a reduction of pri-
66. Id. at 288-90.
67. I have made this point elsewhere. See Barry E. Adler, A Simple Game-Theoretic Solu-
tion to the Tension Between Cramdown and Holdup in Corporate Reorganization (Feb. 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
68. For a further discussion of this debate, see Schwartz, supra note 9.
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ority for secured claims may be socially desirable because, in their
view, secured credit allows debtors to impose risk ex post on "nonad-
justing" general creditors, those who cannot react to the priority
scheme that subordinates them. 69 The result, according to Bebchuk
and Fried, is not that secured credit cheats nonadjusting creditors, at
least other than tort victims. Rather, Bebchuk and Fried recognize
that any consensual creditor, even one who cannot adjust all its loan
terms to a debtor's capital structure, can anticipate subordination and
set the price of its loan accordingly. Bebchuk and Fried are concerned,
nonetheless, that full priority for secured credit may yield inefficient
debtor incentives, as debtors would tend to issue excessive secured
debt in order fully to exploit nonadjusting creditors ex post, a tendency
that can lead to too much secured credit (which, they explain, is plau-
sibly more costly than unsecured credit in some circumstances). Such
excess is inefficient even if consensual nonadjusting creditors antici-
pate, and charge for, such excess ex ante.
70
The argument that tort claims should have first priority is pre-
sented in Part I of this Article. As I have argued before, however,
there is reason to doubt whether any consensual creditor, even a small
one, can meaningfully be described as nonadjusting, as it does not
take much, for example, to take and perfect one's own security interest
and thus avoid even the prospect of subordination.7 1 Moreover, the law
could (but does not) permit a debtor to bind itself, with entry in a pub-
lic record, against excessive encumbrance of its assets. Any creditor
could then safely deal with such a debtor on terms favorable to the
debtor without fear that the creditor's interest later would be
trumped. The debtor's negative pledge, then, could be a substitute for
excess secured credit. 72 Still, even the use of, or reference to, a me-
chanical filing system may be beyond the ken of some casual creditors,
even significant ones, and the matter is thus not simple.
In any case, the argument against full priority for secured
claims is only formally an argument against absolute priority. The
benefits of absolute priority are benefits of contractual priority. If, as
Bebchuk and Fried contend, debtors and nonadjusting creditors can-
69. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 864 (1996).
70. Id.
71. See Barry E. Adler, Secured Credit Contracts, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 409 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
72. Id. For an extended version of the debate on this topic, including a discussion of the po-
tential costs of excess secured credit, compare Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, The Uneasy
Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1304-08 (1997), with Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in
Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1396, 1415-17 (1997).
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not freely contract for ideal terms, then the principle that supports ab-
solute priority as a social good is inapplicable.
The role of secured credit aside, there is a more fundamental
set of theories that is often mislabeled as an argument against abso-
lute priority (though not necessarily by the theorists themselves).
These theories advance the role of contractual concessions to holders
of junior interests rather than deviations from contractual priority
(and are thus mislabeled). In what he describes as "Contracting About
Bankruptcy," Alan Schwartz has argued that it may be in the interest
of some firms, though not all, to share even insolvency returns with a
debtor's equity interest (shareholders and managers). 73 The idea is to
give equity, which is presumed to have private information, an incen-
tive to dispose of the debtor's assets efficiently. That is, with a share of
even the insolvent debtor, equityholders will have an incentive to
make the correct decision on a matter of primary importance for a fi-
nancially distressed firm, whether to continue or liquidate. Ideally,
this share, or "bribe," would be set so that the owners' stake in the
monetary returns from the bankruptcy process would be just large
enough for the owners to benefit more from liquidation than continua-
tion where liquidation proved optimal, this despite the higher private
benefits the owners would garner from reorganization. With this pre-
ordained bribe in place, the owners could not credibly threaten to con-
tinue a debtor when liquidation would be the better course because
continuation would cost the owners the bribe and the owners would
thus suffer with the creditors from inefficient continuation. The con-
tract would thus be "renegotiation proof."
Schwartz did not write on a blank slate. Others have advocated
similar sharing proposals. Thomas Jackson and Robert Scott, for ex-
ample, have argued that deviations from absolute priority serve to re-
duce an insolvent debtor's incentive to gamble with assets that would
otherwise go to creditors in bankruptcy. 74 Even so, Schwartz's charac-
terization of sharing as a contractual choice, rather than as a devia-
tion from contract, is an advance as he recognizes that not all debtors
would opt for sharing. On the one hand, Schwartz recognizes that eq-
uity may unduly favor continuation not merely because of the inherent
gamble but because of the private benefits they earn from continua-
tion itself. On the other hand, Schwartz observes that the bribe can,
for some firms, be unduly costly from an ex ante perspective, as an-
73. See Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J.
1807, 1827-30 (1998) (drawing its central model from Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bank-
ruptcy, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127, 130 (1997)).
74. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors'Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989).
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ticipation of the bribe, out of the creditors' share, can unnecessarily
increase the debtor's cost of capital. If, for example, ex post renegotia-
tions would cost little, and if creditors expected to capture almost the
entire share of surplus from such renegotiation, the debtor could
achieve the lowest possible interest rate on a loan without the bribe in
place. Absent the bribe, the owners could threaten inefficiently to con-
tinue, but the parties would, by hypothesis, negotiate easily to an effi-
cient liquidation, the benefit of which would redound to the creditors,
and ultimately to the debtor's original owners.
There is, in Schwartz's work, therefore, a proper ex ante per-
spective. But he does not tell a complete story (or claim that he does).
Schwartz notes, correctly, that an unnecessary bribe to equity would
raise the debtor's ex ante cost of capital, but he treats the event of in-
solvency as exogenous to the insolvency distribution rule. As noted
above, much of my own work has been devoted to exploring the en-
dogeneity of insolvency and the process through which insolvency is
addressed. There is a similar endogeneity between insolvency and the
distribution rule. In particular, I have in prior work observed that al-
though a bankruptcy distribution to an insolvent debtor's owners may
reduce the insolvent debtor's incentives to take risks, such as con-
tinuation itself, anticipation of such a distribution may have the per-
verse and opposite effect of increasing the owners' incentives to take
risks when the debtor is on the verge of insolvency.7 5 Others have
noted that anticipation of a payoff for an insolvent debtor's owners
leaves the owners with less incentive to avoid insolvency, and the
owners might thus expend less effort toward that end. 76 So Schwartz's
objective to minimize the owners' take consistent with an efficient con-
tinuation decision ex post is only part of an ideal optimization strat-
egy. A general account of capital cost requires consideration not only
of how insolvent firms deploy assets but also of how solvent firms de-
ploy assets, perhaps on their way to insolvency.
B. Accelerated Resolution of Financial Distress
There is general agreement that, at least in the United States,
bankruptcy comes too late rather than too early in the life of a finan-
75. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 473-75
(1992); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy,
57 J. FIN. 445 (2002).
76. See, e.g., Paul Povel, Optimal Soft or Tough Bankruptcy Procedures, 15 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 659 (1999). Povel's conclusions are analogous to the well-known Jensen and Meckling re-
sult that outside equity finance reduces managerial incentive as compared with outside debt fi-
nance. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 33, at 344-51. Sharing makes debt more like equity.
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cially distressed firm. Often, by the time a debtor has come under the
influence of bankruptcy's collective process much value has already
been wasted. For the most part, this fact has been treated as inevita-
ble, like the weather. Unlike the weather, however, late resolution of
financial distress could be managed, if not entirely controlled, if the
law were favorable.
When a debtor becomes insolvent, its managers may have an
excessive incentive to gamble with the firm's assets for reasons now
well rehearsed in this Article. As noted above, ex ante sharing con-
tracts with equity can mitigate such perverse incentives, but, as also
noted, there are costs to such contracts. Thus, managers may have
both the incentive and the discretion to exhaust a debtor's last avail-
able dollar before bankruptcy's day of reckoning is at hand. The fact
that managers cannot exhaust more than the last dollar available,
however, presents an underappreciated control opportunity, an oppor-
tunity based on an underappreciated provision of current bankruptcy
law.
In many instances, a firm can recapture transfers, called void-
able preferences, made to creditors within ninety days of the firm's
bankruptcy. 77 In Logic and Limits, Thomas Jackson explains that
preference law "is essentially a transitional rule designed to prevent
individual creditors from opting out of [bankruptcy's] collective pro-
ceeding once that event becomes likely. It is part of the attempt to
ameliorate the effects of a common pool problem that justifies a collec-
tive proceeding in the first place."78
On close analysis, however, it is not clear that preference law
serves the purpose given in this standard justification, which assumes
that assets are static. There are few direct or indirect disincentives for
creditor collection, and there is thus little reason to believe that pref-
erence rules have any significant effect on such activity. As I have ar-
gued in prior work, it may be that preference law serves a valuable
purpose in its capacity to diminish rather than protect a troubled
firm's assets.79 Inasmuch as many firms in financial distress, perhaps
most, are most valuable if liquidated, such diminution may serve in-
vestors' collective interest.
The story is basically a simple one. Gambles on the eve of
bankruptcy may be profitable for managers or equity but not for inves-
tors collectively. For an insolvent firm, continuation itself may be of
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (2000).
78. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 125.
79. See Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 575, 576 (1995).
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negative net present value and presumably would, therefore, consti-
tute an investment that equity and creditors as a group would not
have agreed to sanction ex ante were it possible to contract for all con-
tingencies. Contracting ex post does not offer an ideal solution to a
debtor's risk incentive, because negotiations could consume significant
resources or break down and, as discussed above, because anticipation
of an ex post bribe to managers or equity could unnecessarily increase
the debtor's ex ante cost of capital.
Bankruptcy's voidable preference law discourages negative-net-
present-value investment by negating eve-of-bankruptcy pledges of
collateral for antecedent debt and by prohibiting the enforcement of
promises to allow eve-of-bankruptcy collection of new loans before ex-
isting debt becomes due. Negation of these pledges and promises effec-
tively raises a distressed firm's (ex post) cost of capital and thus dis-
courages unduly risky investment. That is, the preference laws make
it harder for insolvent debtors to finance their perhaps desperate pro-
jects. Bankruptcy thus becomes an attractive, or the only, alternative
for managers sooner than would otherwise be the case. This analysis
uniquely demonstrates a solution to the puzzle of why preference law
should void a creditor's eve-of-bankruptcy improvement of priority,
which cannot result in dismemberment. Thus, as compared to the
static asset approach, this dynamic view offers a richer explanation of
voidable preference law.
8 0
There is, moreover, an opportunity for preference rules to do
more. Managers of financially distressed firms may urgently seek new
capital from new sources to keep equity's options alive. An event that
may precipitate such a crisis is a demand for payment by an existing
creditor. Current preference law does not prevent, or even discourage,
an insolvent debtor from replacing matured low-interest obligations
with new high-interest, secured, or relatively short-maturity obliga-
tions all at the expense of other, unmatured obligations. This is so be-
cause current preference law does not apply to a new or old lender
whose new loan delays the debtor's bankruptcy and who then collects
on a secured loan at any time prior to bankruptcy, or on an unsecured
loan before any preference period begins, or waits out any bankruptcy
process for ultimate collection on favorable terms. In response to this
80. This dynamic approach to preference law demonstrates a mechanism through which
preference law can hasten financial distress and thus substantiates the observation, made by
George Triantis and Ron Daniels, that preference law accelerates the date on which creditors
scrutinize the debtor. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive
Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1093 (1995).
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problem, as I have discussed in prior work,81 Congress could amend
the preference rules, or if the law permitted, parties could contractu-
ally adopt their own. The applicable rules could provide that a new
loan to an insolvent (or otherwise specified financially distressed) firm
would be unenforceable to the extent the new loan contained better
terms for the lender than those of the old loans the debtor subse-
quently repaid. To assure that the debtor could not avoid this limita-
tion by offering a lender not a new high-interest or secured loan but a
new safe unsecured loan at the expense of other general creditors with
loans of long maturities, the law, or contract, could disallow any col-
lection on the new loan prior to the longest maturity of any loan out-
standing at the time of the new loan. If a lender were forced by a low
interest rate or long maturity on a general obligation to internalize
the true risk of the debtor's failure, the lender would balk at a request
for a new loan and force the debtor into a collective process.
As noted above, bankruptcy is a less-than-ideal collective proc-
ess. Alternatives such as Chameleon Equity, described in Part II of
this Article, may provide a superior resolution to financial distress.
The prospect of such alternatives enhances the value of preference
rules as an accelerator of financial distress. If financial distress is ac-
celerated, a debtor's managers may have limited opportunity to misin-
vest assets prior to a default that triggers a collective process. If that
collective process itself restores incentives for proper investment,
there is a reduced risk of misinvestment after the onset of crisis. The
overall effect could be a more or less continuously proper set of in-
vestment incentives and a consequently lower ex ante cost of capital
than could be obtained through other methods of incentive optimiza-
tion such as deviations from absolute priority (or, more precisely, from
payments to holders of junior claims or interests even where senior
claims are not fully satisfied).
These illustrations of how preference rules can affect invest-
ment incentives identify the proper perspective of rules that will gov-
ern in the event of financial distress. That perspective must permit
examination of a debtor's incentives not only before financial distress,
but before investment itself.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy law, broadly defined, is fundamental to private or-
dering, but its essence is much simpler than commonly understood.
81. See Barry E. Adler, Accelerated Resolution of Financial Distress, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1169,
1197 (1998).
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Bankruptcy must resolve inconsistent obligations and may serve other
functions, such as provision of a fresh start to individuals, but bank-
ruptcy need not provide a collective-action process. The rest of what
traditionally goes under the rubric of bankruptcy, including the crea-
tion of appropriate investment incentives in the shadow of a bad-state
outcome, is essential, but is not essentially a bankruptcy function, ei-
ther in the fundamental or process sense.
Separated into its constituent parts, bankruptcy law becomes
easier to see as broadly important-like property, contract, and tort
law-and becomes more manageable, no longer an amorphous, indeci-
pherable law of last resort. The proper perspective on a topic does not
imply that policymakers will reach good decisions or even agree on an
objective, but clear air at least brings potentially desirable objectives
into view.
